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Academic Leadership Journal
Governing boards have the unenviable duty of trying to oversee in a responsible and responsive way a
complex and long-enduring social institution whose arcane workings few board members,
administrators, or faculty ever fully comprehend. Enduring social institutions of any kind are, of course,
like great leviathans borne by currents and instincts in ways and directions they need not understand in
their continuing pursuit of sustenance and self-preservation. However, if one is to effect any meaningful
change in the values and conduct of the leviathan, one must take into account the environmental
dynamics and motivational stimuli that determine the thing’s behavior. Otherwise, the internal
bureaucracy takes over, tucking well-intended mandates into already existing routines, rendering
compliance necessarily efficient but also largely perfunctory.
Such, I believe, has been the case with post-tenure review.
Background:
In the mid 1990’s post-tenure review was a hot issue on the agenda of many governing boards around
the country. They were quite successful in ensuring that policies and processes were developed and
put in place; and now many, if not most, public institutions have some form of post-tenure review. The
reviews of the review began coming in around the turn of the millennium. Though these were mixed, the
prevailing sentiment was that not a lot had changed. E.g., an article in the Chronicle of Higher
Education on “The Fallout from Post-Tenure Review” noted that after almost a decade of wide-spread
implementation “the firing of tenured faculty members as a result of post-tenure review is extremely
rare” and that “the number of tenured faculty members who have received unsatisfactory ratings during
their reviews is also tiny” (Gabriela Montell, October 17, 2002).
The effectiveness of any policy initiative may of course depend on where you look and whom you talk
to, especially since the rigor of the policy and seriousness with which it is implemented may differ from
university to university. Although there have been few instances in which dismissal proceedings have
resulted from post-tenure review, we do not know how many tenured faculty may have shored up their
performance in anticipation of a review or how many may have chosen to retire or move on rather than
face the embarrassment of a development plan or the risk of dismissal proceedings. But the issue is
finally less whether some good may have come of this added layer of faculty evaluation than whether
the results are worth the time expended in achieving them. In any case, one must question whether
post-tenure review has to any significant extent fulfilled its presumed purpose.
There are, I think, two basic reasons why post-tenure review has made little difference in the behavior
of universities and their faculties.
1. Assumptions driving post-tenure review were not as well informed as they might have been, and so
such reviews wound up providing at best a more systematic approach to the application of recourses
already in place—however seldom employed. Some of the faulty assumptions, such as the following,
still persist in the public view: that tenure is a lifetime guarantee of a job—whereas it is, at bottom,

simply a guarantee of due process; that once faculty members achieve tenure, their performance is no
longer evaluated—whereas, at all institutions I know, faculty members are evaluated annually; and that
tenure protects deadwood (along with wormwood)—an allegation difficult to prove or deny, since
performance is relative and perceptions differ.
2. Of greater significance, however, is that post-tenure review comes across as punitive by intent and
design. It may indeed prompt the application of recourses that were already in place and may by
means of developmental plans either shore up weak performance or build a case for dismissal. But the
fact remains that it functions purely as a negative incentive, threatening to all but significant only for the
sub-marginal. With perhaps some rare exceptions, there is simply nothing in it for the generally
capable, let alone outstanding, faculty member.
Proposal:
My purpose here, however, is not to weigh the value or success of post-tenure review; there is already
an abundance of literature available the subject (see, for instance, the works of Richard P. Chait, Martin
J. Finkelstein, and Jack H. Schuster). Rather, I want to offer a novel approach to faculty ranks that could
make post-tenure reviews more meaningful.
The three academic ranks of assistant professor, associate professor, and full professor are almost
universal among institutions of higher education in the United States. Faculty members considered to
be on “tenure-track” normally begin their careers as assistant professors. If they are awarded tenure at
the end of the probationary period, they are at many if not most institutions bumped up to associate
professor, where they remain for six to ten years on average or even indefinitely. They can look forward
to only one more bump—to professor—in a career that may span 30 to 40 years or more.
If we look at the military, an even more enduring social institution, we find ten ranks among
commissioned officers, though four are at the level of General or Admiral, a rank few ever achieve.
Thus, an officer intent on a career in the military has a succession of promotions to strive toward.
Promotion becomes progressively more difficult, of course, and a relatively small percentage is likely to
advance as far as Colonel or Navy Captain.
In the military the scope of responsibilities and the number of personnel overseen normally increase
with each promotion. The same cannot be said for faculty members. Assistant professors, associate
professors, and professors all do essentially the same job. For the most part, professors continue to
teach the same courses they taught as assistant professors, and their research remains focused on the
same field or sub-field. Their service activities may range more widely, and they may become
increasingly valuable to the university through their experience with curriculum, accreditation, etc. But
they have no more rungs on the ladder once they have become professors, even though they may have
many years left in their careers. The effect on overall performance of this lengthy status quo may vary
from individual to individual. Though it may make no difference to many, for others the desire to excel
may erode in the absence of explicit recognition for continued contributions or new levels of
accomplishment.
What I propose, then, is increasing the number of faculty ranks and tying promotion to post-tenure
review. The three traditional ranks could be preserved but would need to be subdivided.

At the assistant professor level, a lengthy probationary period is observed in virtually all universities
around the country that have tenure. Probably most institutions now have some version of what is
commonly called the “third-year review,” in which assistant professors are subject to an evaluation more
comprehensive than the annual one, especially with respect to their progress toward and prospects for
achieving tenure. Following the review they are usually apprised of what appear to be their strengths
and weaknesses and may be given guidance for shoring up the latter. If a faculty member’s
performance is seen as seriously deficient, the member may be given notice of non-renewal, following
a terminal year of employment. The third-year review serves the interests of both institution and faculty
member, in that if separation is advisable and foreseeable, it is best accomplished sooner than later.
Assistant professors who survive the third-year review are not home free, of course, with tenure being a
foregone conclusion, though the odds may shift in their favor. However, there is no reward other than
continued employment for those who pass the third-year review, even if with flying colors. A division of
the assistant rank into initial and advanced status could both strengthen the meaning of third-year
reviews and extend recognition for a job well done—at least up to that point. Those with positive
reviews could be promoted to the advanced level, preferably with at least a modest salary boost to give
tangible recognition to their achievement. Those with mixed reviews might be retained in the same
initial status, and those with decidedly poor reviews could be given a terminal contract.
The ranks of associate professor and professor, which usually carry tenure, could also be divided into
successive levels, with consideration for promotion to the next level coming at designated intervals, the
length of which could either mandatory or advisory, depending on an institution’s preference. This
proposed post-tenure review would have one of three outcomes: 1) promotion to the next level; 2)
continuation at the same level; 3) continuation but on a development plan intended to remedy evident
deficiencies in performance. In the last case, an institution’s existing policies governing post-tenure
review would apply. Usually, such policies contain the provision that if performance does not improve
following implementation of a development plan, the faculty member may be subject to dismissal
proceedings.
If the post-tenure review results in promotion to the next level, this should come with a significant merit
raise—apart from any annual raise, whether based on merit, cost of living, or a combination of those.
Annual evaluations are important for untenured faculty members, who need timely feedback on their
performance, given their probationary status; but whether annual evaluations and annual consideration
for merit should continue to apply at the upper ranks—under a scheme such as the one I am proposing
—are issues that each university or university system would have to decide for itself. Since academic
careers do not develop in neat yearly segments, annual evaluation of tenured faculty members has
always seemed to me too frequent, though it may have some value and at worst it wastes a modest
amount time. An interval of three years provides for a better-balanced assessment of performance
across the spectrum of faculty responsibilities and university expectations. Moreover, the prospect of a
significant merit raise increases the incentive and gives promotion to the next level or rank tangible
significance—even if annual evaluations, possibly with more modest merit raises, should be continued.
Obviously, any raises related to cost of living or correction of demonstrable inequities should continue
to apply in accordance with existing policies, regardless of how merit is handled. One issue that always
comes up is that funds available for merit raises typically vary from year to year, thus creating the
potential for inequities and unfairness in the award of these over time. But that potential is realized only
if an institution allows it to be. Disparities may be inevitable from year to year, since revenues are

seldom predictable, but institutions can and certainly should ensure that over time merit increases are
fairly awarded.
The following columns outline how the proposed scheme might work. Again, the variables could be
manipulated according to the preference of the university (within any mandated constraints), depending
on the amount of flexibility deemed possible and prudent. I have used numerals for the different levels
within each traditional rank. More descriptive titles could be used (such as “Advanced,” “Senior,” etc.),
but given the loaded nature of most titles, I have stuck with neutral designations. The exception is the
last rank, “Professor of the University,” which can be considered an optional one. If it is used, in my view
it should require a nomination as well as review process and should be considered an honor bestowed
only on those whose professional contributions as faculty members have been truly outstanding. Again
in my view, a faculty member so honored should hold the title for no more than a limited number of
years, as determined by the institution.
Benefit:
The post-tenure review
systems I have seen rely
exclusively on the stick
approach (though there may
be exceptions). They
provide virtually no incentive
for faculty members whose
performance is consistently
capable or outstanding. The
proposed scheme retains
the stick but also offers a
carrot. If post-tenure review
were combined with
successive opportunities for
promotion and merit increases, faculty members would have an incentive not just to avoid demonstrably
substandard performance but to try to maintain and improve their productivity and effectiveness. The
university would benefit, students would benefit, and faculty members would benefit.
Would faculty members welcome an approach like the one I have proposed? Certainly, many of them
no doubt resent the punitive nature of current post-tenure review systems and find them at best an
unnecessary bother. That does not mean, however, that they would welcome change, especially since
they might see the proposed scheme as setting up yet more hurdles for them to clear (however
gratified they might feel in clearing them). Besides, any new scheme would require new strategies for
getting ahead and could rouse fears that some colleague might find a way to game the system and so
jump a rung ahead. Nonetheless, faculty members are highly motivated by competition and by reward
systems that recognize their merits and contributions. Some faculty members may have an inflated
notion of the value of theirs and may become resentful if their performance is not judged to be as
competitive as they believe it to be. So, the more opportunities for promotion there are and the more
rigorously evaluation criteria are applied, inevitably the more contentiousness one can expect to have
to deal with. The proposed scheme would therefore have its downsides. But if it is axiomatic that

problems can never be entirely eliminated, it is equally true that they can be exchanged for ones that
increase the margin of contentment and productivity.
No longer urgent as an issue, post-tenure review as an outcome remains but grudgingly accepted on
the one hand and seemingly short of its intended purpose on the other. It is, nonetheless, here to stay.
An approach to it that recognizes the value of positive incentives could help to ensure that faculty
members remain engaged and effective. That is surely the end sought, and it is a worthy one, but the
means must be commensurately worthy if the end is to be achieved.
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